Reference in fiction by Friend, Stacie
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Friend, Stacie (2020) Reference in fiction. Disputatio 11 (54), pp. 179-206.
ISSN 0873-626X. (In Press)
Downloaded from: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/27238/
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.
Disputatio, Vol. XI, No. 54, December 2019
© 2019 Friend. Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License
Reference in Fiction
Stacie Friend
Birkbeck, University of London
DOI: 10.2478/disp-2019-0016 BIBLID [0873-626X (2019) 54; pp.179–206]
Abstract
Most discussions of proper names in fiction concern the names of fic-
tional characters, such as ‘Clarissa Dalloway’ or ‘Lilliput.’ Less atten-
tion has been paid to referring names in fiction, such as ‘Napoleon’ (in 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace) or ‘London’ (in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four). 
This is because many philosophers simply assume that such names are 
unproblematic; they refer in the usual way to their ordinary referents. 
The alternative position, dubbed Exceptionalism by Manuel García-
Carpintero, maintains that referring names make a distinctive seman-
tic contribution in fiction. In this paper I offer a positive argument for 
Non-Exceptionalism, relying on the claim that works of both fiction 
and non-fiction can express the same singular propositions. I go on to 
defend my account against García-Carpintero’s objections.
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1 Introduction
Philosophers of language and of fiction have focused substantial en-
ergy on the question of how to understand the names of fictional 
characters, such as ‘Clarissa Dalloway’ or ‘Lilliput.’ Traditionally, 
such names were considered paradigm instances of empty (non-re-
ferring) singular terms, and played an important role in motivating 
Frege’s (1948) introduction of sense (Sinn) as well as Russell’s (1905) 
descriptivist account of ordinary proper names. Correlatively, emp-
ty names have been construed as a serious challenge to the theory 
of direct reference, or referentialism, according to which the semantic 
contribution of a name to the proposition expressed by an utterance 
is just its referent. At the same time, a number of philosophers have 
argued that these names are not in fact empty; instead, they refer (in 
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one way or another) to real fictional entities.1
Far less attention has been paid to referring names in fiction, such 
as ‘Napoleon’ (in Tolstoy’s War and Peace) or ‘London’ (in Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four). The working assumption within analytic philoso-
phy—though not in other disciplines—is that such names pose no spe-
cial problems. Whatever one’s theory about how names secure their 
reference, or about their semantic contribution, the standard view is 
that the same is true of referring names within the fictional context.
Recently, though, several arguments have put pressure on this 
standard view. The upshot of these arguments is Exceptionalism: the 
claim that referring names make a distinctive semantic contribution 
within fiction (García-Carpintero, this volume). The nature of this 
contribution turns on other theoretical commitments. Exceptional-
ists who advocate fictional realism deny that names such as ‘Napo-
leon’ or ‘London’ take their ordinary referents in fiction; instead, 
they refer to fictional entities that are surrogates of the real individu-
als (Parsons 1980; Voltolini 2013; Motoarca 2014). Exceptionalists 
like García-Carpintero, who defend referentialism about names in 
ordinary assertive contexts, maintain instead that they function de-
scriptively within fiction. I focus primarily on the latter version of 
Exceptionalism in this paper.
It is important to appreciate how strong the Exceptionalist con-
clusion is. If Exceptionalism is right, then authors of fiction who 
use referring names can never invite readers to entertain singular 
thoughts about real individuals, even if they intend readers to engage 
in imaginings about those real individuals and even if they meet all 
criteria of reference. The Non-Exceptionalist position, by contrast, 
need not hold that authors of fiction who use such names always invite 
readers to entertain such thoughts (though this is the default in the 
cases I consider). If referring names can be used in other contexts in 
other ways, then the same applies to fictional discourse.
In what follows I defend Non-Exceptionalism. I begin by outlin-
ing the conditions of reference to show that authors of fiction can 
satisfy them as well as authors of nonfiction (§1). I then propose that 
1 There are a wide range of realist positions. See Kroon and Voltolini 2018 for 
an overview. More recent versions are proposed by Bourne and Bourne (2016) 
and Terrone (2017).
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the role of referring names in nonfiction is to invite readers to enter-
tain singular thoughts about their referents (§2). In §3 I argue that we 
have good reasons to say the same about fiction, resulting in a unified 
account of names across contexts. I go on to consider Exceptional-
ist reasons for denying this unified account and argue that they are 
inadequate (§§4–5). Finally, I criticize Exceptionalism (§6).
2 Conditions of reference
A radical form of Exceptionalism holds that fiction is by definition 
non-referring. I will not consider this view here; most philosophers 
reject semantic accounts of fiction in any case. However, as a prelim-
inary to defending Non-Exceptionalism, it is important to establish 
that the mechanisms of reference are exactly the same in fiction and 
nonfiction.
I begin with nonfiction. The following sentence is from Alison 
Weir’s history The Princes in the Tower, in which she argues that Rich-
ard III ordered the murder of his nephews, Edward V and Richard, 
Duke of York.
(1) “Undoubtedly Richard had a charismatic charm that he could 
exert when he wished to; there are many still in thrall to it 
today.” (Weir 2011: 129)
In this sentence the name ‘Richard’ designates Richard III, brother 
to Edward IV and last of the Plantagenet kings of England. How is 
reference determined? In virtue of what does Weir designate one 
particular individual using the name ‘Richard’?
Glossing over numerous subtleties, there are three competing 
answers to this question. According to the first, the name refers to 
Richard III because Richard III uniquely satisfies descriptions Weir 
associates with the name. On this descriptivist view, the reference 
of a name is secured by fit. Borrowing a common metaphor, we may 
say that Weir’s use of ‘Richard’ is linked to a dossier or mental file 
that contains information (veridical or not) about Richard.2 We can 
construe mental files as ways of organizing relatively stable informa-
tion about an individual in memory. They are associated with notions: 
2 Dossier is Evans’s (1973) term, borrowed from Grice (1969).
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mental representations of individuals, which function in cognition 
much like names (Crimmins and Perry 1989).3 By the time Weir 
wrote The Princes in the Tower, she would have had a very rich file on 
Richard. The descriptivist position is that Weir refers in her history 
to Richard III because Richard uniquely satisfies certain descriptions 
Weir associates with her notion of him.
Importantly, the descriptions that must be satisfied according 
to this view are those in Weir’s mental file—her beliefs about 
Richard—not those in the work itself. The Princes in the Tower surely 
represents Weir’s beliefs. But even if Weir’s portrayal of Richard 
were a tissue of lies, it would be a tissue of lies about Richard. 
According to descriptivists, what secures reference is the fact that 
Richard uniquely fits the content of descriptions in Weir’s mental 
file, regardless of how she describes him to others.
In light of arguments by Donnellan (1970) and Kripke (1980), 
many philosophers reject descriptivism about reference-fixing. They 
take the use of a name to refer to an individual not because the in-
dividual satisfies certain descriptions, but because the use is linked 
in one way or another back to that individual. The links relevant to 
reference are characterized in two different ways in the literature. 
According to the first, uses of a name are linked together by co-ref-
erential intentions (Korta and Perry 2011).4 Weir refers to Richard III 
insofar as she intends to use the name ‘Richard’ in the same way as 
those from whom she learned the name, who intended to use it the 
same way as those from whom they learned the name, and so on back 
to Richard’s “baptism” (Kripke 1980). The co-referential intention 
may be manifested simply by deferring to others’ uses of the same 
name talking about the same individual as they do (Sainsbury 2015). 
The basic idea is not limited to a single chain of deferring uses, or 
even to uses of the same name. For instance, Richard is also called 
‘Gloucester’ because he was the Duke of Gloucester. The practices 
3 Most philosophers identify notions with mental files. I prefer to treat no-
tions as distinct representations, linked to mental files but also deployed in other 
representations. For discussion see Recanati 2012: 38–41.
4 Korta and Perry (2011) prefer the broader concept of conditional co-reference, 
or coco-reference, where the intention is to refer to the same person as others do on 
the condition that there is such a person.
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of using the names ‘Richard’ and ‘Gloucester’ are each part of a larg-
er network of linguistic references, linked together by intentions to 
refer to the same individual, the origin of the network (Perry 2012). 
Because the network is sustained by intentions to refer using names 
and other linguistic devices, I call this a name-centric condition of 
reference (Friend 2014).
Gareth Evans (1973) famously criticized name-centric accounts, 
arguing that co-referential intentions could not explain the possibil-
ity of reference shift. For example, although the name ‘Madagascar’ 
was (we are told) originally used to refer to a part of the African 
mainland, Marco Polo mistakenly used it for the island off the coast. 
The name came to refer to the island, even though Polo presumably 
used it with the intention to refer to the same thing as his native 
guide. According to Evans, the shift occurred because the informa-
tion associated with the name ‘Madagascar’ in the network came to 
be overwhelmingly derived from the island rather than the main-
land.5 Evans concluded that we should not take the referent of a name 
to be the origin of a co-referential network, but instead the dominant 
source of information associated with the name: roughly, the source 
of most of the most important information in people’s mental files 
(Dickie 2011, 2015). I call this an info-centric condition of reference.
Philosophical disputes over the appropriate conditions of refer-
ence focus on cases, such as Evans’s Madagascar example, where the 
name-centric and info-centric conditions deliver different verdicts. I 
suggest that conflicts between the conditions can make it impossible 
to determine reference. For example, if most of the information in 
Marco Polo’s mental file comes from the island, then the island is 
plausibly the referent of his notion; and it is this referent, the one he 
“has in mind,” about which he intends to speak. At the same time, 
however, he uses the name ‘Madagascar’ with the intention of ex-
ploiting the same convention as his native guide, to refer to the same 
place. He cannot fulfill both these intentions, generating “confusion” 
(Lawlor 2007). As a result, reference is simply indeterminate.
In most cases, however, distinguishing between the name-centric 
and info-centric conditions has no practical importance. There is a 
5 There are other interpretations of the Madagascar example (see e.g. Devitt 
1981), but I use this to illustrate the info-centric view.
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single communication network that sustains uses of names to co-
refer and transmits information about the referent, so that the origin 
and the dominant source of information are one and the same. Be-
cause this kind of network need not be restricted to names, but may 
involve other linguistic as well as non-linguistic representations, I 
will call it a representation-network.6 My view is that representation-
networks secure reference. However, as we have seen, Weir meets 
all three reference conditions, including the descriptivist one.
There is no reason to deny that authors of fiction can meet pre-
cisely the same conditions.7 Take Orwell’s use of the name ‘London’ 
in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Given his acquaintance with London—he had 
lived there for a number of years by the time he wrote the novel—
the information in his mental file certainly derives from the city. 
In addition, Orwell intends to use the name ‘London’ to co-refer 
with others engaged in the practice of talking about the same place. 
For example, he writes that before the Fifties, “Airstrip One, for 
instance, had not been so called in those days: it had been called 
England or Britain, though London, [Winston] felt fairly certain, had 
always been called London” (Orwell 1962: 30). Since Orwell knew 
London well, it is also likely that the city uniquely satisfies the de-
scriptions Orwell associates with the name—not the descriptions in 
the novel, of course, but the ones in his mental file.
Consider now Shakespeare’s portrayal of Richard in The Tragedy 
of King Richard the Third. The playwright uses names familiar to his 
audience, including ‘Richard’ and ‘Gloucester.’ By doing so he mani-
fests his intention to co-refer with others engaged in the practice of 
talking about Richard, thereby meeting the name-centric condition. 
Shakespeare relied primarily on two sources for the history plays: 
Edward Hall’s The Union of the Two Noble and Illustre Families of Lan-
caster and York (1548) and Raphael Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, 
Scotland and Ireland (1587), both of which drew their information 
about Richard from Thomas More’s History of King Richard III (Nor-
wich 2009). Shakespeare therefore relies on information that ulti-
mately derives from Richard, transmitted from Richard’s contempo-
raries to More and through Hall and Holinshed to Shakespeare. He 
6 The term is Everett’s (2013: 90).
7 See Mole 2009 for further arguments in favour of reference in fiction.
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therefore meets the info-centric condition on reference as well. In 
short, there is nothing barring authors of fiction from satisfying the 
same conditions of reference as authors of nonfiction.
3 The role of reference in nonfiction
If authors of fiction can meet the same reference criteria, there is no 
obstacle to a unified account of the contribution of names in fiction 
and nonfiction. In this section I consider the role of referring names 
within nonfiction. In §4 I argue that these names play exactly the 
same role in fiction. In making this argument I assume referential-
ism. I adopt this theory not only because I think that a version of 
the theory is correct, but also because Exceptionalists like García-
Carpintero assume that names in nonfiction function referentially.
Motivated by the anti-descriptivist arguments of Donnellan and 
Kripke, referentialists hold that names contribute only their bearers 
to the “proposition expressed” by utterances containing them.8 The 
proposition expressed reflects the subject matter of a thought or utter-
ance: ordinarily, these are the features of the world in virtue of which 
the statement counts as true or false (Perry 2012). For example, sup-
pose that I make the following claim about the historical facts:
(2) “Richard had his nephews murdered.”
The subject matter of this statement is Richard III and his properties. 
Therefore we can specify the content of (2) using a singular proposi-
tion, a proposition containing Richard as a constituent. Following the 
usual format, I will represent this proposition as an ordered pair of 
an object and a property, where the boldface indicates that Richard 
himself is a constituent of the proposition:
(R) <Richard III, having-had-his-nephews-murdered>9
8 Referentialism, which concerns only the semantic contribution of an ex-
pression to truth conditions and not the way reference is fixed, should be distin-
guished from Millianism, according to which names have no content or function 
other than as tags for objects (Martí 1995). I defend the former but not the latter.
9 I assume for simplicity’s sake that having had one’s nephews murdered is a 
property, because nothing here turns on the analysis of the predicate.
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I take propositions to be a tool used by philosophers to classify utter-
ances and thoughts according to their truth conditions (Perry 2012). 
For any utterance or thought, we can specify a variety of different 
truth conditions, depending on what we take for granted. (R) indi-
cates the truth conditions given facts about reference: that the name 
‘Richard’ refers to Richard III. For this reason, I will follow Perry 
in calling it a referential content. To say that the individual Richard is a 
“constituent of the proposition” is just to say that a thought or utter-
ance whose content can be specified with (R) will be true in virtue 
of facts about Richard, regardless of how anyone thinks of him.
If we did not take the facts about reference for granted—for in-
stance, if someone heard me utter (2) without knowing about whom 
I was speaking—we could capture what is understood with a differ-
ent proposition, one containing a reflexive reference condition (in 
italics) rather than an individual as a constituent:
(R´) <the referent of ‘Richard’ in (2), having-had-his-nephews-
murdered>
In other words, (2) is true so long as the individual to which my to-
ken of ‘Richard’ in the very same utterance refers had his nephews 
murdered. (R´) specifies the reflexive content of (2), rather than the 
referential content (Perry 2012). It should be clear that both (R) and 
(R´) provide truth conditions for (2), and indeed that (R) is just (R´) 
with the information about reference inserted. It should be equally 
clear that (R), rather than (R´), reflects the subject matter of my ut-
terance: I am talking about Richard III, not about the mechanisms of 
reference.10
Suppose that the point of my uttering (2) is to make an asserta-
tion that will cause my historically-uninformed interlocutor Louise 
to form a belief, and that I am successful.11 The content of Louise’s 
belief can also be specified by (R). I assume for the sake of simplicity 
the representationalist view that a belief of this sort exhibits a syn-
tactic structure similar to the sentence that expresses it.12 So we can 
10 This is not always the case. For instance, if I introduce myself by saying “I 
am Stacie,” I likely communicate the reflexive content.
11 I here skirt issues concerning whether assertion should be defined this way.
12 This is a description of the mental at a certain level of abstraction; I claim 
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say that Louise’s belief has at least these two components: a notion 
of Richard and a mental representation of the (no doubt complex!) 
property of having had one’s nephews murdered. I’ll use the term 
idea for a mental representation of a property or relation (Crimmins 
and Perry 1989). Then we can represent the belief this way (using 
double brackets to indicate representation of the kind of thought):
<< Richard-notion, idea-of-having-had-one’s-nephews-murdered >>
I will say more about mental representations of this kind shortly. 
First let us turn to the case of nonfiction.
As we have seen, in The Princes in the Tower Weir argues that 
Richard III ordered the murder of his nephews. In so doing, she 
asks readers to form a belief like Louise’s, whose content can also 
be specified by (R). Most readers will possess a notion of Richard 
prior to opening the book, but if they do not they will form one 
in response to reading. Weir’s book weaves a narrative that invites 
us to represent Richard as having certain properties, including 
culpability in the murder of his nephews. Indeed readers are not 
only supposed to represent Richard as guilty, but also to believe that 
he was, exporting this information into their mental files on Richard 
(Gendler 2000). The content readers are invited to believe is (R), or 
(more accurately) can be specified by (R).13 Some readers will not 
agree with Weir’s conclusions, for instance committed members of 
the Richard III Society who are unalterably convinced that Richard 
was falsely accused. Such readers disbelieve (R).
To form any attitude whose content can be specified by (R) re-
quires having a singular thought, sometimes also called a de re thought, 
about Richard.14 Weir’s history invites readers to believe, of Richard, 
that he had his nephews murdered. Singularity is preserved so long 
as the Richard-notion included in our mental representations is not 
associated with a descriptive “mode of presentation”: that is, if we do 
only that it is useful to classify thinkers as having beliefs of this structure.
13 The qualification allows for multiple ways of specifying the belief content. 
In what follows the qualification should be understood.
14 Walton (1990) and Jeshion (2010) use this terminology. However, in my 
view singular thoughts need not have an object, in which case they cannot be de 
re (Crane 2013: 153).
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not think of Richard merely as the individual satisfying certain condi-
tions, but in a more direct sense. The usual way of cashing out this 
sense is by appeal to the role of mental files in cognition, where these 
files constitute our cognitive perspective on the individual. When I 
think or talk about Richard, I mobilize the file associated with my 
Richard-notion, using it to recognize further references, updating 
the file as I learn more, and so on. In this way the structure of no-
tions and mental files enables me to bind together and keep track of 
information about individuals as well as to identify and re-identify 
them in thought (Jeshion 2010). Because the reference of a notion 
and the associated mental file is determined by representation-net-
works rather than by satisfaction of descriptive content, notions can 
be interpreted as non-descriptive modes of presentation (Recanati 
2012). On this picture, thinking of individuals by deploying notions 
constitutes singular thought about those individuals. So, Weir’s his-
tory invites us to engage in singular thoughts about Richard.
4 A unified account
I claim that we can offer exactly the same account of referring names 
in fiction.15 A unified account is not merely methodologically attrac-
tive. It also provides the most plausible explanation of the systematic 
semantic contribution of proper names to fictional content.
There are good reasons to think that Shakespeare’s Richard the 
Third invites us to entertain exactly the same singular thought, 
whose content can be specified with (R), as Weir’s history. First, 
we have seen that Shakespeare meets the conditions of reference and 
would have expected his audience to recognize this. Second, the play 
clearly represents Richard as having had his nephews murdered. In 
Act IV, Scene ii Richard tells Buckingham, “I wish the bastards dead; 
/ And I would have it suddenly performed.” He later instructs Tyrrel 
to kill “those bastards in the Tower.” After Tyrrel reports that the 
deed is done, Richard expresses pleasure knowing that “The sons 
of Edward sleep in Abraham’s bosom.” On any account of fictional 
15 García-Carpintero locates an ancestor of the “Uniformity Argument” I give 
in this section in Parsons 1980: 57–8. This argument is distinct from the argu-
ment I gave in favour of reference in fiction in Friend 2000.
189Reference in Fiction
content—what is “true in the fiction” or storified (Friend 2017)—it is 
part of the content that Richard had his nephews murdered.
I will assume, as does García-Carpintero, that works of fiction 
prescribe or invite imagining what is storified (Walton 1990).16 (NB. 
I do not define fiction in these terms; see §5). There is substantial 
disagreement about what this means, and more generally about the 
nature of imagining. However, this disagreement does not concern 
me for the moment. On any plausible account, imagining that P re-
quires, at a minimum, forming a mental representation with the 
content P. My claim is that Richard the Third invites us to form a men-
tal representation with the content specified by (R). Or in differ-
ent terms, the play invites us to imagine, of Richard, that he had his 
nephews murdered.
One might object that it is not possible to imagine that Richard 
was guilty if one also believes that he was guilty. The objection as-
sumes that imagining and believing that P are incompatible. How-
ever, adopting this line requires denying that works of fiction invite 
us to imagine what is storified. After all, works of fiction storify 
many ordinary truths, for instance that St. Petersburg is in Russia (in 
Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina) or that slavery existed in nineteenth-century 
America (in Morrison’s Beloved).17 Those who wish can reinterpret 
the “invitation to imagine that P” as the “invitation to believe that P 
is storified.” This will have no effect on my argument, which is that 
(R) is the content that is storified. I return to the contrast between 
belief and imagining in §4.
A reason to interpret the play as inviting us to imagine (R), rather 
than a general proposition, is that this is not the only attitude invited 
by the play toward the same content. As an exemplification of the 
Elizabethan genre of “historicall poesie,” Richard the Third functioned 
to popularize English history while entertaining the audience.18 
The play is thus standardly interpreted as inviting belief in Richard’s 
16 Walton (2015) has more recently argued that this is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition.
17 How many real-world truths are storified in a fiction is controversial, but 
most theorists accept that at least some are. I defend a more expansive view in 
Friend 2017.
18 See Campbell 1947: 98 and Shapiro 2000: 199.
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(real-world) guilt. The invitation to belief explains why revisionist 
historians object to the portrayal of Richard as responsible for the 
murder of the princes, but not to his portrayal as ordering the death 
of his brother George, Duke of Clarence, who was actually executed 
under Edward IV. It is well-known that Shakespeare altered events 
and compressed chronology for artistic reasons, and the death of 
Clarence exemplifies this poetic license. The death of the princes at 
Richard’s order, by contrast, comes (by way of Hall and Holinshed) 
from More’s account, itself a piece of Tudor propaganda.
The most plausible conclusion is that Richard the Third invites us 
both to believe and to imagine (R). To fulfill either prescription, we 
must form a mental representation associating our Richard-notions 
with the idea of having had his nephews murdered. Insofar as the 
notion is appropriately linked to Richard himself, the content of our 
mental representations can be specified by (R). Notice that this is so 
even if we are not aware of it; a reader who thinks that Richard is a 
merely fictional character will nonetheless be imagining of Richard, 
in virtue of the fact that her Richard-notion was formed in response 
to the play.
Now, suppose that revisionist historians are correct and Richard 
was the innocent victim of a Tudor disinformation campaign. Then 
Shakespeare’s portrayal misrepresents Richard in more ways than he 
intended; but so too does Weir’s. In that case, a fiction such as Jose-
phine Tey’s crime novel The Daughter of Time, which portrays Richard 
as innocent, will be (in this respect) more accurate than Weir’s non-
fiction history. Importantly, Tey’s purpose in writing The Daughter of 
Time was precisely to change people’s beliefs about Richard. And she 
was successful; her novel is largely responsible for inspiring the revi-
sionist movement in the twentieth century that has sought to rescue 
Richard’s reputation.
A natural description of the situation is that Tey’s novel asks read-
ers both to imagine and to believe precisely the opposite of Weir’s 
history and Shakespeare’s play. If the history and the play invite us 
to believe and/or imagine (R), the novel invites us to believe and 
imagine its negation.
Now suppose that I, like many others, read The Daughter of Time, 
and imagine that Richard was innocent. Moreover, convinced that 
Tey’s portrayal is accurate, I export this representation of Richard 
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into the beliefs in my mental file on Richard. We would not deny 
that the content of my belief about Richard is a singular proposition, 
precisely the belief I would assert if I uttered “Richard did not mur-
der his nephews.” Yet the mechanism for forming this belief was im-
agining as Tey’s novel prescribed: that is, imagining that Richard did 
not murder his nephews. It is at best ad hoc to maintain that I believe 
a singular proposition as a result of imagining an entirely different 
proposition. It is far more plausible that the proposition imagined 
is exactly the same proposition I come to believe. Since imagining 
that Richard is innocent is imagining as prescribed by The Daughter of 
Time, it follows that the novel storifies a singular proposition.
However, there is more to imagining as invited by a work than 
imagining a singular proposition. When a work prescribes imagin-
ing about an individual, we count as fulfilling the prescription only 
insofar as our imaginings are prompted in the right way by the work 
itself. If I have never heard of Shakespeare’s play, but find myself day-
dreaming about Richard III having his nephews murdered, I might 
imagine (R); but that is not sufficient to fulfill the prescription gen-
erated by Richard the Third. My imagining (R) must be connected 
appropriately to the play.
The appropriate connection requires, among other things, de-
ploying a Richard-notion that is embedded in the same representation 
network as Shakespeare’s references to Richard—“downstream” of 
the play, so to speak. Call the relevant network the Richard-Shake-
speare network, and any notion embedded in it an R-S-notion. Then we 
can specify not just the content to be imagined, but the way in which 
it should be imagined, as follows:
(Rn) <Richard III(R-S-notion), having-had-his-nephews-murdered>
The italicized subscript indicates the type of notion involved; differ-
ent people have different Richard-notions appropriately related to 
Shakespeare’s play, but we can classify them together. The notion 
is not part of the referential content, but instead specifies the way in 
which we are supposed to imagine that content. Fulfilling an invita-
tion to imagine requires imagining the right content in the right way, 
by deploying appropriate notions.19
19 Because the relevant notion-type is determined by its place in a particular 
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The same is true for invitations generated by nonfiction. One of 
Weir’s stated purposes in writing The Princes in the Tower is to “convince 
all those who read this book” (Weir 2011: xiv). For it to be the case 
that I am convinced by Weir’s history of Richard’s guilt, my new belief 
must bear an appropriate relation to reading her work; believing (R) 
independently does not qualify. It follows that in believing Weir I must 
deploy a Richard-notion that is embedded in the Richard-network, 
“downstream” of Weir’s references. Nothing about this requirement 
threatens the singularity of my belief. I need not think of Richard 
in any descriptive way; I automatically deploy the appropriate notion 
when I believe (R) on the basis of reading Weir. The same is true of 
the fiction case: Imagining (R) while deploying a notion embedded in 
a certain network does not imply thinking of Richard descriptively.
It remains the case that different works can invite us to imagine, 
believe, doubt, deny (and so on) the same referential content. This 
can only be so if we accept a unified account of proper names. Given 
the clear advantages of a unified account, we should take it as the de-
fault position. The burden of proof lies with the Exceptionalist who 
treats the fiction and nonfiction cases differently. In the rest of the 
paper I describe and critique arguments for Exceptionalism.
5 A presupposition of exceptionalism
Exceptionalists agree that in The Princes in the Tower, Weir refers di-
rectly to Richard III and invites readers to entertain singular thoughts 
about him. However, they insist that in fiction referring names func-
tion in a special way, in parallel with the names of fictional charac-
ters. As mentioned in §1, this might mean either that the names des-
ignate a fictional entity or that they make a descriptive rather than 
singular contribution to storified content. In this section I consider a 
presupposition of all forms of Exceptionalism.
For any version of Exceptionalism to be plausible, there must be a 
contrast between fiction and nonfiction that underpins the differing 
contributions of referring names. The standard contrast relies on a 
distinction between the responses invited by works in each category: 
representation-network, we can also specify the prescription with what Perry 
(2012) calls network content. See Friend 2011b for details.
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Authors of nonfiction make assertions that invite belief, whereas 
works of fiction are characterized by fictive utterances that invite im-
agining.20 I have argued elsewhere that such accounts fail to draw an 
adequate distinction between works of fiction and nonfiction (Friend 
2008, 2011a, n.d.). The basic reason is simple: There are no features 
possessed by all and only works of fiction or all and only nonfiction. 
On the Genre Theory I propose, categorization as fiction or nonfic-
tion relies on a set of non-essential criteria (Friend 2012). Such cri-
teria could not sustain a sharp contrast in the semantic contribution 
of names.
More importantly for present purposes, even if the fictive utter-
ance theory were correct it would not support Exceptionalism. First, 
all advocates of this approach allow that works of fiction can contain 
assertions, and most allow that the very same bit of text can be both a 
fictive utterance and an assertion. This may be because we can adopt 
different stances to the work depending on our interests (Lamarque 
2014); or because the work or its parts may invite different responses 
from different audiences (Currie 1990) or may be governed by differ-
ent norms (Davies 2007, 2012; García-Carpintero 2013); or because 
the kind of imagining invited by fiction simply does not exclude at 
least some assertion (Stock 2016, 2017). If this is right, Exceptional-
ists must treat at least some uses of referring names within a fiction 
as inviting singular thoughts about their referents: specifically, when 
those names contribute to assertions. And they must treat other uses 
of the names—or the same uses interpreted according to a different 
stance or different norms—as inviting other kinds of thoughts. This 
is hardly a unified account of names within works of fiction.
Let us set aside this concern and assume that we are faced with 
a fiction that uniformly invites imagining. Does the fact that we are 
meant to imagine rather than believe entail that the storified content 
cannot be singular in the same sense as nonfiction? García-Carpinte-
ro (this volume), citing some remarks by Fabian Dorsch (2016), 
suggests that “the imagination lacks constitutively singular, reality-
involving contents.” However, the contrast that interests Dorsch is 
with perception rather than belief. Belief cannot be constitutively 
20 There are many versions of fictive utterance theory, differing in important 
ways. See the next paragraph for citations.
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singular, since we can have general beliefs. But from this it does not 
follow that beliefs can never be singular, and the same should apply 
to imagining. Dorsch, for example, writes that reference may be 
secured in visual imagining or visual depictions with “an addition-
al thought or intention of the subject or artist concerned” (qtd by 
García-Carpintero, this volume). If an author fulfills the conditions 
of reference (§1), the storified content can be singular.
In that case it is hard to see what justification there could be for 
the claim that the corresponding imagining cannot be singular. For 
example, some imagining involves perception, which (let us assume) 
is constitutively singular. Suppose that you are looking directly at a 
friend, and you imagine her wearing a funny hat. In this case you sure-
ly imagine, of your friend, that she is wearing a funny hat. The same 
plausibly applies even if the friend is not in front of you; when you call 
her to mind, you can engage in singular imaginings about her. The 
case contrasts sharply with imagining that there is someone wearing a 
funny hat; or that there is someone in front of you, who looks like your 
friend, wearing a funny hat; or imagining that a surrogate of your friend 
is wearing a funny hat. I conclude that there is nothing about the dis-
tinction between fiction and nonfiction that supports Exceptionalism.
6 Arguments for exceptionalism
However, Exceptionalists offer further reasons for their views, rely-
ing on an analogy to the descriptive modes of presentation involved 
in attitude ascriptions. For example, Lamarque and Olsen argue that 
descriptive content plays an essential role in fiction because of the 
“aspectival presentation of objects,” which authorizes only certain 
ways of thinking about them:
The Canterbury Tales is about a pilgrimage to Canterbury. Now Canterbury, 
since the 1960s, is a city with a university. But The Canterbury Tales is 
not, from the fictive point of view, about a pilgrimage to a city with 
a university (or even to a city which would later have a university). 
Chaucer’s fictive presentation does not authorize this perspective on 
either the city or the pilgrimage. (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 126; see 
also Lamarque 2014: 145–146)21
21 Lamarque later notes, however, that “the opacity is not intrinsic but reflects 
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García-Carpintero (2015: 157) agrees that the “modes of thinking” 
about fictional characters and real individuals “provided by the rel-
evant fictions are essential to their contents: no proper appreciation 
can ignore them.”
As a consequence, these Exceptionalists argue, descriptions de-
termine the semantic contribution of the name to what we are in-
vited to imagine. For example, Lamarque and Olsen write,
The London of, say, Tom Jones is presented under different aspects 
from the London of, say, Bleak House; so the sense (or descriptive 
content) of the name will be different in the two novels, even though 
both the denotation and the inscription-type are the same. (Lamarque 
and Olsen 1994: 81–82)
By contrast with works of nonfiction, which will normally invite 
a transparent construal of their proper names or other referential 
devices, fictional narratives are typically opaque: to understand and 
appreciate them as fiction we must focus on the ways in which the 
content is presented, and not merely on the content itself (Lamarque 
2014: 146). García-Carpintero (2015: 162) similarly argues that ap-
preciation involves attention to the way real individuals are repre-
sented, concluding that the contribution of even a referring name to 
the literary text is constituted by purely descriptive features.
These theorists differ, though, over which descriptions are rel-
evant to semantic content. For Lamarque and Olsen (1994: 132– 
33), the sense is given by the qualitative descriptions in the text that 
are especially salient, the ones we take to be most important to the 
portrayal of the individual. García-Carpintero instead offers a meta-
linguistic analysis in terms of “reference-fixing presuppositions,” 
that is, facts about how names designate their bearers. Whereas in 
ordinary assertion these presuppositions merely determine which 
individual is part of the singular proposition, García-Carpintero 
(2015: 157) contends that in fiction they become part of the content 
itself. For instance, he takes the descriptive content of the empty 
name ‘Bloom’ and the referring ‘Dublin’ in Joyce’s Ulysses to be “per-
son named ‘Bloom’/city named ‘Dublin’ in relation to tokens used in Ul-
ysses.” According to either approach, the way in which the author 
a certain kind of interest taken in the narratives” (2014: 146). I set aside this 
qualification here because it plays no role in García-Carpintero’s argument.
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represents a referent—either via qualitative descriptions or the use 
of a particular name—is part of the storified content, rather than the 
individuals themselves.
Exceptionalists give several reasons in support of this contention. 
First, they point to failures of substitutivity in reports of storified 
content, so-called paratextual uses. Lamarque and Olsen (1994: 126) 
observe that one would not substitute ‘the county capital of Kent 
with a university’ for ‘Canterbury’ in reporting what is storified in 
Chaucer’s tales (see also Lamarque 2014: 146). We can construct a 
parallel argument for García-Carpintero’s approach: that one would 
not substitute ‘Leningrad’ for ‘Saint Petersburg’ in talking about 
Gogol’s “The Nose.” García-Carpintero (this volume) makes a re-
lated point in imagining a more unusual piece of fiction, The Fer-
rante Affair, within which there are two distinct characters, Elena 
Ferrante and Domenico Starnone, whose descriptions accord with 
what is known about two real authors with the same names. Now 
suppose that in reality ‘Elena Ferrante’ is a pseudonym of Domenico 
Starnone. Despite the fact that the names co-refer, someone report-
ing the content of The Ferrante Affair would not substitute ‘Ferrante’ 
for ‘Starnone.’
These failures of substitution are meant to parallel Fregean argu-
ments concerning attitude ascriptions. For example, it is widely rec-
ognized that “Aliya believes that Mark Twain is a great author” can 
be true while “Aliya believes that Samuel Clemens is a great author” 
is false, despite the names’ co-referring. Descriptivists take such ex-
amples to undermine the claim that the semantic contribution of a 
proper name is (always) just its referent. Similarly, argues García-
Carpintero, just because The Ferrante Affair prescribes imagining that 
“Starnone wrote Denti” does not mean that it prescribes imagining 
that “Ferrante wrote Denti.”
A second motivation for Exceptionalism comes from “intermedi-
ate” cases, where it is unclear whether a fiction is or is not about a 
particular real individual (Motoarca 2014: 1038–42). War and Peace 
is indubitably about Napoleon Bonaparte (wherever one stands on 
the semantic contribution of the name). Napoleon Dynamite is equally 
indubitably not about Napoleon Bonaparte; the title character is an 
American teenager. I would say the same of the pig Napoleon in Or-
well’s Animal Farm, though here the allusion to the real emperor is 
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important. Yet there are works that present greater interpretive dif-
ficulties, so that it might just be unclear whether the name ‘Napole-
on’ refers to Bonaparte. Motoarca maintains that the mere existence 
of such intermediate cases supports Exceptionalism, but I agree with 
García-Carpintero (this volume) that it does not. This is because ref-
erence may simply be indeterminate, as in the ‘Madagascar’ example 
mentioned in §1. That reference is sometimes indeterminate in fic-
tion (or anywhere else) does not have any implications for how names 
function in clear cases.
Nonetheless, García-Carpintero (this volume) argues that inter-
mediate cases are easier to explain for Exceptionalists. Suppose that 
we have a fiction that can be interpreted equally well as being about 
Napoleon or not about Napoleon. The Exceptionalist can treat a name as 
making a consistent contribution across all interpretations of a work, 
whether this be a descriptive condition or a fictional surrogate. The 
difference in interpretations, on this approach, is merely a difference 
in how much information about the real individual we are permitted 
to import into our imaginings or export from the story into our beliefs. 
By contrast, the Non-Exceptionalist must hold that the name makes 
different contributions in the two interpretations.
A third motivation for Exceptionalism is the denial that there is 
any important difference between the names of real individuals and 
the names of fictional characters within fiction. García-Carpintero 
(this volume) writes, “If ‘Bezukhov’ is a disguised description (or 
refers to an abstract representation …), prima facie we should say the 
same about ‘Borodino’ and ‘Napoleon’ in the relevant discourses.” 
This is supposed to be by contrast with nonfiction as characterized by 
assertion. According to García-Carpintero, assertions that contain 
referring names express singular propositions, and those that con-
tain empty names correspondingly express gappy propositions. This 
is because empty names in nonfiction assertions indicate a failure to 
convey information. In fiction, however, empty names function just 
as well as referring names to prompt imaginings. The Exceptionalist 
aims to preserve this uniformity of names within the fictional context 
by denying the uniformity of referring names across contexts.
García-Carpintero (this volume) offers one further argument in 
favor of descriptivist Exceptionalism, viz. that we do not have the 
same intuitions of rigidity concerning names in fiction as we do 
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about names in other contexts. Roughly: Whereas Napoleon could 
not but be Napoleon (and no one else could have been he), “Napoleon 
in War and Peace” need not have been “Napoleon in War and Peace” (and 
anyone else could have been he). This is because Napoleon would 
have existed whether or not Tolstoy wrote War and Peace, and there 
could have been a Napoleon character in the work even if Tolstoy had 
known nothing of the real individual but only coincidentally matched 
his description. Ultimately the underlying intuition is that “it doesn’t 
matter who plays the Napoleon role [in the worlds of the fiction]; it 
only [matters] that the role is played in the way the fiction mandates.”
7 Against exceptionalism
An unattractive consequence of the Exceptionalist approach is that 
the distinction between imagining about real individuals and imagin-
ing about fictional characters collapses. Lamarque and Olsen (1994: 
131) hypothesize that “make-believe reflection on fictional characters 
(or states of affairs) is not cognitively different from make-believe 
reflection on real objects (or states of affairs) aspectivally presented 
in works of fiction.” For example, though Graham Greene refers di-
rectly to a real place, “the Brighton of Brighton Rock still in a sense 
remains a fictional city” (1994: 293). That is because readers are only 
permitted to think of Brighton under the mode of presentation, the 
descriptive sense, determined by the novel itself. Similarly, García-
Carpintero’s view is that we imagine about both real and invented 
individuals by thinking about them descriptively, as the bearers of 
certain names used in works of fiction.
However, it just looks false that reference makes no cognitive 
difference (see Kot’átko 2010). Suppose that I read Brighton Rock, which 
prescribes imagining that Pinkie Brown murders Fred Hale on Palace 
Pier. It is a natural continuation of my imagining to consider various 
ways in which Fred Hale might have escaped by hiding in different 
places in Brighton. This kind of supposition makes sense only if I am 
imagining about the same Brighton (and Fred), despite departing from 
the ways they are described in the text. Engaging in such “counter-
fictional” imaginings is often essential to understanding a story (Friend 
2011b). A similar point holds for the author’s way of designating a 
referent. Perhaps Alena, having read “The Nose” earlier, forgets the 
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name Gogol used, thinking instead of the setting as Leningrad. It is 
still possible for Alena to imagine as invited by the story.
These examples highlight the central flaw in the descriptivist ap-
proach: the conflation of modes of presentation—the ways in which 
thinkers access an individual—and the subject matter of our imagin-
ing about that individual. I think of Brighton as a place of which I 
have fond memories strolling along the pier. If I imagine that Fred 
Hale is murdered in the same Brighton, I think about Fred and Bright-
on, not the ways in which they are designated in the text. It is true 
that to imagine as prescribed, I must recognize that the names are 
used by Greene in a certain way. It is also true that we can specify the 
prescription to imagine with a proposition that does not take these 
facts about reference for granted, as with (R´) above. Even so, the 
reference-fixing presuppositions are not plausibly part of the subject 
matter to be imagined. They reflect how we think of the referent (if 
any), not what we imagine about it.
I do not deny that works of fiction also generate invitations to im-
agine whose subject matter concerns the mechanisms of reference. 
For example, “The Nose” invites us to imagine that the city is named 
‘Saint Petersburg’ rather than ‘Leningrad,’ since the narrator uses 
that name and the story is both written and set at a time when that 
was its name. As a consequence, readers are invited to imagine that 
the events occur in a city named ‘Saint Petersburg.’ If Alena forgets 
the name used in the story, she cannot satisfy these kinds of invita-
tions. But it does not follow that when she imagines that Major Ko-
valev chases his nose through Saint Petersburg, the subject matter of 
her imagining is the city named ‘Petersburg’ in “The Nose” or any similar 
descriptive content.
Compare: Weir’s history invites us to believe that Richard III was 
also called ‘Gloucester.’ So it invites us to believe that the man called 
‘Gloucester’ had his nephews murdered. It does not follow that when 
we believe that Richard had his nephews murdered, the subject mat-
ter of our belief is the man called ‘Gloucester’ in Weir’s history. In both 
cases, the referential content includes the real individuals as con-
stituents; just as our belief is about Richard rather than his name, our 
imagining is about Saint Petersburg rather than its name.
García-Carpintero (this volume) denies that his argument col-
lapses the cognitive difference between the cases. He proposes that 
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where a representation or surrogate is “vicarious” for a real individ-
ual, we are licensed to import and export information about that 
individual in a way that does not obtain for fictional characters. I 
do not think that differences in import and export are adequate to 
capturing the cognitive contrast, however. This is evident when we 
consider fictional characters who are based on or represent real indi-
viduals in a looser way than reference. For example, Jonathan Swift’s 
Gulliver’s Travels is (among other things) a satire of specific people and 
institutions that would have been easily recognizable to his original 
audience. The Lilliputian Treasurer Flimnap is generally taken to 
represent or allude to Sir Robert Walpole, Swift’s political enemy 
and frequent target. In imagining Flimnap, readers are supposed to 
import some knowledge of Walpole into their imaginings and to ex-
port some features of Flimnap to their beliefs. But that is not the 
same as imagining, of Walpole, that he is a six-inch Lilliputian.
Conversely, we may be invited to imagine a real individual to be 
so different from the reality that most import and export are blocked. 
For instance, in Norman Spinrod’s 1972 novel The Iron Dream, Adolf 
Hitler moves to the U.S. in 1919 and becomes a science-fiction writ-
er. Understanding this novel requires imagining, of (the real) Adolf 
Hitler, that he lived a very different life, although we are prevented 
from importing or exporting much information about him. We can, 
of course, import information from before 1919; but we can then 
just imagine a fiction in which Hitler—that very person—died as a 
baby, and no importation will be appropriate.
If this is right, then it is no virtue of Exceptionalism that it treats 
all such cases in the same way. Entertaining a singular proposition 
is just different from entertaining a general proposition, whether or 
not the attitude we take to the proposition is imagining. If we are 
dealing with a fiction that can be interpreted equally well as being 
about Napoleon and not about Napoleon, then the two interpretations 
storify different contents. This does not mean, however, that they 
have nothing in common; for one thing, their reflexive contents are the 
same (§2). But at the level of referential content we would find a stark 
difference. The consequence for intuitions about rigidity should be 
apparent: given that Tolstoy referred to Napoleon in War and Peace, 
no one else could be Napoleon in War and Peace. A fictional character 
could be named ‘Napoleon,’ or have various properties of Napoleon, 
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and therefore—but in a very different sense—count as “Napoleon-
in-War-and-Peace”; but that would not make the character Napoleon.
The upshot of these considerations is not disunity in the treatment 
of names within fiction. That conclusion would follow only if the 
names of fictional characters function descriptively, but that is some-
thing I deny. When I imagine that Bezukhov wants to assassinate Na-
poleon, I do not merely imagine that someone or other who fits cer-
tain descriptions wants to assassinate Napoleon, nor need I engage 
in any imaginings about a name or its tokens. My imaginings seem 
rather to be directed at a particular individual. I claim that even with 
fictional characters, we are invited to engage in singular imaginings. 
Because I reject fictional realism I do not think that such names con-
tribute referents to semantic content. Instead, utterances containing 
them, whether in fiction or nonfiction, express gappy propositions 
(as García-Carpintero says regarding nonfiction). In my view, lack 
of reference is no obstacle to authors’ using names to invite singular 
thoughts understood on the model described above, that is, by de-
ploying notions associated with mental files, even if those notions fail 
to refer. Accounting for the intentionality of thought in the empty 
case is certainly a challenge, but not one restricted to fiction.22 So 
there is a uniform account for names across and within contexts, 
though only some names have referents.
Nor do considerations of substitutivity aid the descriptivist. Even 
if it were true that we would not substitute co-referring names in 
paratextual discourse, the explanation would have nothing to do 
with fictionality. Suppose that I believe the revisionist historians who 
argue that Richard III was not responsible for his nephews’ murder. 
I still would not normally report what is storified in Weir’s nonfic-
tion history by saying, “In Weir’s book, the king who did not mur-
der the princes in the tower was charming when he wished to be.” 
The misleading implication of such a report is that Weir describes 
Richard as innocent, much as the misleading implication in the other 
examples is that Chaucer describes Canterbury as the county capital 
of Kent with a university, that Gogol calls the city “Leningrad,” or 
that ‘Starnone’ and ‘Ferrante’ are interchangeable within the world 
22 Here I agree with, e.g., Jeshion (2010) and Crane (2013). However, those 
who reject this claim can reformulate the claims in terms of ‘as-if singular thought.’
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of the story. This shows that substitution within reports of storified 
content might be problematic insofar as these reports are treated as 
de dicto (that is, as indicating the actual wording in the text). Even 
if all reports of storified content were de dicto, however, this would 
have no implications for the content of the story itself, just as the sin-
gularity of beliefs is not threatened by views on which propositional 
attitude reports are de dicto.
Furthermore, reports of storified content need not be de dicto. 
Suppose that Alena reads Gogol’s “The Nose” in 1982, at a time when 
her native city is named ‘Leningrad.’ In describing what happens in 
the story, it would be natural for her to use the Soviet name, particu-
larly when highlighting events that have occurred in familiar loca-
tions. Similarly, when conversationalists recognize the real individu-
als depicted in a roman à clef, they may use the fictional name and the 
real name interchangeably. If I say, “In Joel Klein’s Primary Colors, Bill 
Clinton has several affairs,” I report the content accurately, despite 
failing to use the invented name ‘Jack Stanton.’ Even descriptions 
can figure in de re reports of storified content, if the context is ap-
propriate. A tour guide in London might announce, on Baker Street, 
“Holmes and Watson lived on the road where you are standing now.”
The Starnone/Ferrante case is designed to demonstrate more than 
the failure of substitution in reports of storified content, though; it 
is meant to show that the imaginings prescribed by The Ferrante Af-
fair “about Starnone” do not have the same content as imaginings 
“about Ferrante.” The significance of the example turns on how it is 
elaborated. García-Carpintero suggests two possibilities: either the 
author is a “playful postmodernist” or she is “ignorant of the facts.” I 
will assume that in both scenarios, the author fulfills the conditions 
of reference outlined in §1. Otherwise (e.g., if the author merely 
intended to base two fictional characters on the real individuals), the 
case could not constitute a counterexample to Non-Exceptionalism.
Suppose, then, that the author intends to refer, but falsely believes 
that the names ‘Elena Ferrante’ and ‘Domenico Starnone’ designate 
two different, real people. She is in exactly the same position as the 
ancients who did not realize that the Morning Star and the Evening 
Star were the same object (Venus). If the author were writing nonfic-
tion, presumably García-Carpintero would say just what we ordinar-
ily say about the astronomically ignorant: that she unknowingly refers 
203Reference in Fiction
to the same thing twice over, inviting readers to believe two sets of 
(at least partially incompatible) singular propositions with the same 
individual as a constituent. I see no reason to deny that this is also true 
in the fiction case. Regardless of the attitude, the invitation is to mo-
bilize two notions associated with two names and two mental files, 
which happen to co-refer. If readers are as ignorant as the author, they 
will find this straightforward, though unbeknownst to them they are 
all the time imagining of the same individual. Readers aware of the 
error will have to do whatever we ordinarily do when we seek to 
understand the beliefs of someone who is confused about reference.
The more interesting case is one in which the author, far from 
being ignorant, is a playful postmodernist who expects readers to 
recognize the twice-over reference. Such a fiction, if successful, 
ought to strike readers as challenging and (perhaps) amusing. But it 
is challenging only insofar as it invites us to imagine, of the same real 
person, that he is two different characters. If the story merely invites 
us to imagine in one way about a ‘person named Ferrante’ and in 
another way about a ‘person named Starnone,’ then it is hard to see 
where the interest lies. This case seems to support Non-Exception-
alism rather than Exceptionalism.
Conclusion
I have argued that the reasons offered by García-Carpintero and others 
in favor of Exceptionalism are inadequate to undermine a unified 
account of the semantics of names, and moreover that Exceptionalism 
has implausible consequences. However, in closing it is worth noting 
that the argument as I have presented it relies on the assumption, 
shared by García-Carpintero, that the correct semantics of proper 
names in other contexts is referentialist. Someone convinced by the 
kinds of Fregean considerations marshalled by García-Carpintero for 
the fiction case could just as well argue that names in all contexts 
are descriptivist, thereby defending a more traditional form of Non-
Exceptionalism. It is my view that this would be a mistake; fiction, 
no less than nonfiction, invites readers to entertain singular thoughts 
about the referents of names.23
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